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1. Introduction 
 
The objective of this article consists of analysing empirically the effects that 
employment promotion measures designed for people with disabilities have on the 
latter’s job matching quality. 
It is widely known that disabled individuals undergo a situation of wage discrimination, 
negative prejudices (with degrees depending on the type of disability), and that they 
have much lower participation rates than non-disabled individuals (which are also 
dependent on the type of disability). Previous researches supporting these statements 
are, for example, Baldwin and Johnson (1995), Loprest et al. (1995) or Kidd et al. 
(2000). Different policies have been implemented in many countries in order to 
countervail their disadvantaged position in the labour market. There exist two wide 
groups of policies: on the one hand, income transfer programmes; on the other hand, 
employment promotion measures. The former have already been previously studied 
(see, for example, the survey by Bound and Burkhauser, 1999). However, the use of 
employment promotion measures has been much scarcely analyzed (see Corden and 
Thornton, 2002, for a review of evaluations from different countries).  
In this paper, we present an analysis of the impact of these measures on the quality of 
the matching associated jobs found by disabled people. Since, up to our knowledge, 
there is no previous research on this issue, our study constitutes a novelty in the current 
literature. The interest of our analysis also lies on the fact that in order to ascertain the 
job quality of disabled individuals, focusing only on the employment or re-employment 
probability —which follows from employment promotion measures— would offer a 
partial analysis. This is so to the extent that, for instance, a precarious entry into the 
labour market is considered a success when compared to unemployment, even in spite 
of the fact that workers with a poor quality match might be very likely to be dismissed 
in the first place whenever a crisis begins. That is, not only the entry or re-entry into 
employment is a subject of concern when analyzing disabled people’s labour careers. 
For this reason, our focus will not consider the effects of employment promotion 
measures on their job finding success, but on their job quality success. For this purpose, 
two proxies for the job matching quality are used. On the one hand, the type of contract 
—either open-ended or temporary— constitutes an ‘objective’ or ‘demand-side’ 
measure to the extent that it is sensible to assume that open-ended contracts are 
associated to better matching quality than temporary contracts. On the other hand, a 
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‘subjective’ or ‘supply-side’ measure is given by the knowledge of whether or not 
disabled workers are searching for another job. We will assume that whenever workers 
are searching for another job, they internally are considering that their job matching 
quality can be improved, and that, as a result, that their job matching quality is lower. 
We use data from a Spanish survey launched in the year 1999 which is especially 
designed to obtain a representative picture of people with disabilities in Spain, which 
includes information on employment in a similar way as other labour force surveys 
collect. This information takes into account whether the current job has been obtained 
through an employment promotion programme, and whether the disabled worker has 
used labour market intermediation services specifically designed for people with 
disabilities. An important characteristic of this survey is that disability is not defined as 
‘disability to work’ but as ‘disability to day-to-day activities’ —following the 
recommendations of the World Health Organization— and, therefore, the self-
justification bias will not contaminate the results.  
The impact of employment promotion measures on the quality of the job match will be 
estimated through a non-experimental approach, in particular, matching evaluation 
techniques. The rationale underlying this empirical method is to compare two groups of 
homogeneous individuals. Our findings show that employment promotion measures do 
not affect job matching quality of disabled workers. In addition, the use of specialized 
labour market intermediation services presents no significant impact either on the 
probability to obtain an open-ended contract or to search for another job, although a 
negative effect on finding an open-ended contract is obtained with some cases. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we describe the theoretical 
framework. The third section describes the data set and the main variables of the 
empirical analysis, especially the definition of disability in the survey. The fourth 
section explains the details of the evaluation methodology. The fifth section presents 
and discusses the empirical results. The final section presents the main conclusions. 
 
2. Theoretical framework: employment promotion measures and quality of the job 
match 
Employment promotion measures for disabled people can be considered as a particular 
case of active labour market policies. The microeconomic effect which is most likely to 
arise from the latter is an improvement in the probability of exiting from unemployment 
(or, in general, from non-employment). This result would be attained through the lower 
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costs of hiring disabled workers due to special contracts with lower social security 
contributions and, in general, lower non-wage costs of those newly hired workers.. 
Another way of improvement disabled workers’ mobility out of non-employment is to 
change their order in the ‘queue’ of unemployment by giving them a sort of preference 
over non-disabled unemployed individuals. This is the case with a quota system, 
whereby a percentage of the new vacancies is reserved for people with disabilities. The 
rationale behind this system is that prejudices or lack of information prevent firm to hire 
disabled workers even when they have the same productivity as the remainder of 
workers. The implementation of labour market intermediation services specifically 
designed for disabled individuals has a similar rationale:  to improve their entry or re-
entry into the labour market. Given that these intermediation services increase the 
information available both for firms and for workers, the unemployment level related to 
the mismatch will presumably be lower. International evidence also shows that 
assistance with job search and placement planning (i.e., specialized labour market 
intermediation) is effective in improving placement rates and placement outcomes 
(Corden and Thornton, 2002). In addition, they can reduce the problems related to the 
existence of asymmetric information which are relevant for parties to any labour 
contract, but it can be a particular issue for people with disabilities. As Livermore et al. 
(2000) remark, disability is another dimension of uncertainty to the hiring decision, 
which might discourage employers from hiring workers with disabilities. Finally, the 
promotion of sheltered employment centres pretends to increase the probability of 
moving towards employment, because in these centres there is a preference to hire 
workers with disabilities. 
However, these policies’ impact goes beyond the aforementioned effects already stated. 
As such, employment promotion measures can potentially improve the quality of the job 
match held by workers with disabilities. The main reason for this is that those workers 
with a worse job match will tend to be fired in the first instance during crises. 
Therefore, should employment promotion measures increase job matching quality, they 
would also be indirectly lengthening the duration of the underlying labour relationship 
and improving the stability of their labour careers —with the correspondent 
consequences in terms of their social inclusion. On the contrary, if a negative effect of 
these measures on job matching quality is found then labour market integration of 
disabled individuals will be worsened.  
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There are many previous works (almost all of them influenced by Jovanovic, 1979) 
which model the labour market as different processes of job matching between jobs and 
workers. In spite of the fact that most of these optimal job matching models focus on the 
individual job search and are very abstract, they provide a theoretical framework which 
is useful to understand firm behaviour related to the hiring workers with disabilities and 
the quality of their job match (see Livermore et al., 2000). 
As regards the employment promotion measures for people with disabilities, we can 
deduce the following hypotheses. First, measures which consist of reductions in hiring 
costs —reduction in non-wage costs, lower social security contributions, etc.— might 
impact job match quality in two different ways. On the one hand, if there is a problem 
of prejudices or lack of information, this financial incentive might encourage firms to 
hire those disabled individuals who are as productive as non-disabled ones, and, 
therefore, provide them with a high quality job match. On the other hand, the financial 
incentive might promote hires of those disabled individuals who are less productive 
than non-disabled ones, given the compensation which underlies the financial incentive 
of the contract. Presumably, in this latter case, those individual with a poorer match will 
be fired in the first instance during economic crises.  
Second, measures related to protected employment (as, for instance, quota systems) will 
affect job match quality in as much as they imply a reduction in the amount of workers 
available for some jobs. Under a quota system, the firm needs to fill a vacancy by 
considering only a (reduced) subgroup of the labour force (disabled individuals). Even 
taking into account the fact that these individuals might be negatively affected by 
discrimination based on prejudices or lack of information, reaching the same quality for 
the job match at a low cost of candidates’ selection will be presumably more difficult. 
As a result, these measures will be likely to exert a negative impact on job matching 
quality. A similar problem arises with sheltered employment centres, but even more 
pronounced, given that a high proportion of the staff needs to be selected among 
disabled individuals. The expected result will be that these centres’ average productivity 
will be lower. If these centres are not protected from competition in the markets of 
goods and services, the lower quality of job matching will be fatal for their survival as 
productive organizations. On the contrary, if they are protected from the free market, 
they are likely to become an end for disabled individuals’ labour careers, given that —
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as they are not real firms— they are not able to provide the experience required by 
‘normal’ firms1. 
Third, specialized labour market intermediation for disabled individuals might improve 
the quality of the match. The main reason is that this intermediation provides expertise 
and information to both firms and workers, thereby, decreasing unemployment and the 
duration of vacancies related to mismatch. 
To summarize, different effects are expected according to the different measures, to the 
extent that some measures may exert both positive and negative effects on the quality of 
the job match. Therefore, only an empirical analysis can offer us useful information on 
the effects of the employment promotion measures for disabled individuals on the 
quality of the job match. 
 
3. Data and descriptive analysis 
 
The database used in this article is the Survey on Impairments, Disabilities and Health 
State (Encuesta sobre Deficiencias, Discapacidades y Estado de Salud, EDDES) 
launched in 1999. This survey was designed to obtain representative data of the Spanish 
population and the incidence of disabilities in the Spanish population. For this purpose, 
the sample size was increased up to 79,000 households (around 250,000 individuals). 
A similar survey was launched in Spain in 1986. In spite of the fact that this previous 
survey was very useful to obtain basic information about disabled individuals in Spain, 
its information on employment (and, in general, on the labour market participation of 
people with disabilities) was rather limited. However, this experience was useful to 
include a battery of questions related to employment and labour market in the EDDES-
1999. In addition, employment information was obtained (when possible) following the 
methodology of the Spanish Labour Force Survey. Information on the use of the 
different measures of employment promotion was obtained through direct questions on 
the disabled individuals’ current job (obviously, this question was not applicable for 
people without disabilities). 
An important characteristic of the survey is its definition of disability. This definition 
follows the recommendations of the World Health Organization, which defines the 
                                                 
1 For the Spanish case, Malo and Rodríguez (2000) explain that sheltered employment centres are usually 
the end of the labour careers of disabled individuals who are working there. There even exist incentives 
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disability as a consequence of impairments on the functioning and activity of the 
individual. Therefore, disabilities are related to the individual, while impairments are 
related to problems of organs or biological systems of the body. In fact, sometimes 
impairments are compensated by the reception of technical help, in which case, 
impairments are finally not related to disability thanks to such help2. Therefore, the 
information provided by the EDDES-1999 is comparable to other surveys which follow 
the international definitions of the World Health Organization. 
In addition, this definition of disability eludes the self-justification bias, since people 
can not self-classify themselves as disabled for work. That is, instead of asking whether 
the individual is disabled for working, information on disability is attained through 
questions on different aspects of the individual’s day-to-day activities. In particular, the 
questionnaire asks for some diary activities included in a closed list of items, and 
whether or not the individual is limited to perform such activities3. There are 36 
activities aggregated in the following groups: seeing; hearing; communicating; learning 
and application of knowledge; moving inside the household; using arms and legs; 
moving outside the household; caring himself/herself; doing housework; and capability 
to relate to other people. Therefore, the answer to any of these questions is not 
necessarily related to disability to work, eluding the endogeneity bias of other surveys 
—as, for instance, the Health and Retirement Survey of the US4. The question of the 
Health and Retirement Survey is the following: Do you have any impairment or health 
problem that limits the amount of paid work you can do? If so, does this limitation keep 
you from working altogether? Obviously, the results of any analysis on employment of 
disabled people will be heavily biased by the use of this question to classify individuals 
as disabled or non-disabled. 
Another advantage of the definition used in the EDDES-1999 is that it does not include 
chronic illness. This distinction is important because the effects of chronic illness and 
disability may be different. For example, an individual who suffers from diabetes might 
develop a severe problem of vision related to this chronic illness, but many other 
                                                                                                                                               
for sheltered employment centres in order not to promote the transition of their ‘best’ workers to the 
‘normal’ firms, since average productivity of these centres will then be negatively affected. 
2 The most common example is that glasses compensate the impairment of myopia. Otherwise myopia 
would affect the normal activity of the individual because of its associated vision problems. In fact, as the 
case of glasses is an extended situation, they are included in the survey only when the vision problems are 
very severe. 
3 Therefore, the answers could be considered as subjective mobility. 
4 See, for example, Benítez-Silva et al. (2000) about how to deal with the endogeneity bias created by the 
definition of disability as disability to work. 
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diabetic individuals will not have this disability (or even any other disability until they 
get older). A blind’s relationship with the labour market as a consequence of the 
diabetes will be very similar to the experience of other blinds because of other reasons, 
and markedly different from other diabetic individuals who are not blind5. 
To sum up, the data base EDDES-1999 provides very reliable information about 
employment promotion measures for people with disabilities and a definition of 
disability which is free of the most common problems related in the current literature on 
disability. 
 
Tables 1 and 2 present some basic information on the most important variables used in 
the empirical analysis6. First of all, the prevalence ratio of disability in Spain is 5 per 
cent for working age (16 to 64 for males and females) and the distribution by gender is 
almost fifty-fifty considering working age. Its prevalence, however, is higher for 
women when including people 65 or more years old (Malo, 2003). As usual, the 
disability prevalence increases with age, although in the European Southern countries 
the relative importance of the 55-65 years old group is much higher than in the 
remainder of EU-15 countries (Malo and García-Serrano, 2001). 
It is widely known that the participation rate of disabled individuals is much lower than 
for the rest of the population. In Spain and for the year 1999, such rate was 32 per cent, 
while it was 50 per cent for the total population in working age; the employment rate 
was 24 and 42 per cent, respectively, for such year (Malo, 2003). However, the 
unemployment rate was much higher for the former group (26 per cent), than for the 
whole population (16 per cent). Table 1 shows that there are important differences in the 
number of disabilities suffered among disabled individuals. As expected, inactivity 
increases with the number of disabilities, while the opposite is true for employment. 
Table A.1 shows the description of the main variables of the empirical analysis 
(considering only wage and salary workers with disabilities). The proxies for the quality 
of the job match show that 71 per cent of individuals enjoy an open-ended contract, and 
that 6 per cent are searching for another job. Therefore, there is a clear difference 
between the demand-side and the supply-side evaluation of the matching quality. In 
                                                 
5 This is particularly relevant in the special module on disability of the European Labour Force Survey, 
launched in 2002, where individuals are asked about disability and long-term health problems. Therefore, 
analyses using the European Labour Force Survey will be different from those obtained from surveys 
using definitions following WHO recommendations (as the Spanish EDDES-1999). 
6 In addition the appendix shows means and standard deviations of all variables. 
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other words, the subjective (or supply-side) evaluation is better than the objective (or 
demand-side) one. In addition, there exists a relatively low frequency of the use of 
employment promotion measures: from 1 to 5 per cent. We have defined a dummy 
indicating the beneficiary status of any of such measures, which shows that almost one 
fifth (18 per cent) of the wage and salary disabled workers are benefiting from them. 
Finally, 9 percent of disabled individuals have used specialized labour market 
intermediation in order to obtain their current job. 
Table 2 offers the distribution of measure beneficiary status and the use of specialized 
intermediation services by the type of contract and by the fact of searching for another 
job. Approximately, 80 per cent of disabled individuals with a temporary contract are 
not recipients of any employment promotion measure, while this percentage raises up to 
approximately 83 per cent among disabled individuals with open-ended contracts. On 
the other hand, addressing to specialized intermediation is more likely for frequent 
among individuals holding temporary contracts (12.32% versus 7.85%). Finally, the use 
of specialized intermediation does not markedly differ according to whether individuals 
are searching for another job, while being beneficiary of employment promotion 
measures is more common among individuals with an open-ended contract. 
To sum up, the descriptive approach shows a relative low use of employment promotion 
measures for people with disabilities, but there seems to be non-negligible differences in 
the proxies of the quality of the job match. 
 
4. Evaluation methodology 
4.1. The evaluation problem and non-experimental evaluation techniques 
The main purpose of this paper is to assess the impact of employment promotion 
measures on the quality of the jobs found by disabled people7. Assuming that measure 
recipients were a random sample of all those eligible, a valid approach to estimating the 
effect of such measures would be to compare the outcome of the former with those of 
non-recipients. However, where administrators (or firms) are discriminating between 
the less and better able as a basis for measure selection, this process would bias 
estimates of estimated effects if it is unobserved by the evaluator. For instance, if firms 
are taking the best for the measures (i.e., they are ‘cream-skimming’) measure effects 
                                                 
7 As one analyst has recently noted: “The task of evaluation research lies in devising methods to reliably 
estimate [the impact of policy change], so that informed decisions about programme expansion and 
termination can be made” (Smith, 2003). 
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would be over-estimated; similarly, measure effects may be underestimated if the firms 
are targeting measure resources on the least able. In other words, the effect of 
employment promotion measures can be characterized by two distinct processes: on the 
one hand, being recipient of the measure; on the other hand, the process determining the 
outcome (i.e., job quality). The question of selection bias arises when some component 
of the recipient process is relevant to the process determining job quality. If the 
relationship between the two processes can be fully accounted for by observable 
characteristics, selection bias will simply be avoided by including the relevant variables 
in the equation explaining outcomes. However, if unobservable characteristics affecting 
participation can also influence outcomes, controlling for differences in observable 
characteristics does nothing to address the issue of sample selection, and, therefore, the 
estimated treatment effect will be biased. This is the essence of the selection problem.  
In order to assess the effects of employment promotion measures on a recipient 
individual, one must compare the observed outcome —i.e., the factual outcome— with 
the outcome that would have resulted had that person not been recipient of the measure 
—i.e., the so-called counterfactual outcome. However, only the former is actually 
observed, and this is the reason for the evaluation problem, which, in essence, is one of 
missing data. To overcome this problem, all approaches to evaluation attempt to provide 
an estimate of the counterfactual in order to identify measure effects.  There are two 
questions which evaluations might wish to address. The first is what impact programme 
participation would have on an individual drawn randomly from the population —the 
average treatment effect (ATE). The second is what impact participation has on 
individuals who actually participated —the average effect of treatment on the treated 
(ATT). These two effects are identical if we assume homogeneous responses. However, 
where we allow for the more realistic scenario of responses varying across individuals, 
the measures can likewise differ. Both estimates are of interest. While ATT can indicate 
the average benefit of participation, ATE would be relevant were the policy interest 
focused on making a voluntary programme compulsory, for example (see Bryson et al., 
2002).  
Several alternative approaches exists that take explicit account of the selection issue. 
These can be grouped under the broad headings of experimental and non-experimental 
approaches. We focus on non-experimental methods because it is according with our 
dataset. The non-experimental techniques share one thing in common: in the absence of 
an observable counterfactual, assumptions have to be made to identify the causal effect 
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of a policy or programme on the outcome of interest. There are broadly two main 
categories of non-experimental methods: before-after estimators and cross-section 
estimators. The first one has been widely used in evaluations, but requires longitudinal 
or repeat cross-section data, which may not be often available8 as in our case. Our 
dataset is suitable for cross section estimators, which use non-participants to derive the 
counterfactual for participants. The method of matching constitutes one way of doing 
this, along with instrumental variables technique (IV) and the Heckman selection 
estimator9. The general matching method is a non-parametric approach to the problem 
of identifying the treatment impact on outcomes, which is based on contrasting the 
outcome of measure recipients with the outcomes of “comparable” non-recipients —i.e., 
individuals sharing similar characteristics. It assumes that selection can be explained 
purely in terms of observable characteristics, since the choice of the match is dictated by 
observable characteristics. 
Although the technique was developed in the 1980s (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) and 
has its roots in a conceptual framework which dates back even further (Rubin, 1974), its 
use in labour market policy evaluation only became established in the late 1990s. It 
gained particular prominence following the work of Dehejia and Wahba (1998, 1999) 
who, in reanalysing a sub-set of the data used in LaLonde’s (1986) seminal work which 
had established the superiority of experimental estimators, indicated that propensity 
score matching performed extremely well10. As we shall see, the method has an intuitive 
appeal arising from the way it mimics random assignment through the construction of a 
control group post hoc. 
The parameter of interest can be formally described as follows. For any disabled 
individual, define random variables representing the job quality he would have attained 
had he been a recipient of employment promotion measures, and the job quality he 
would have attained had he not. Denote these two potential outcomes by Y1 and Y0, and 
denote employment promotion measure recipient status by a dummy variable, D. For 
each individual, we observe only Y= Y0+(Y1- Y0)D, so Y0 is not observed for measure 
recipients, and Y1 is not observed for non-measure recipients. We might nevertheless 
                                                 
8 For details, see Heckman and Smith (1999), and Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) 
9 See Heckman, 1995, or Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000 for the IV estimator, and Goldberger (1983) or 
Puhani (2000), for the Heckman selection estimator.  
10 This work has been subsequently criticised in studies which show that propensity score matching, like 
other non-experimental techniques, depend on assumptions about the nature of the process by which 
participants select into a programme, and the data available to the analyst (Smith and Todd, 2003; 
 12
still hope to identify certain averages of Y1- Y0. The effect of treatment on the treated 
(Rubin, 1977) is one such parameter: 
[ ] [ ] [ ]1|1|1| 0101 =−===− DYEDYEDYYE                 (1) 
This tells us whether, on average, programme recipients benefited or suffered from 
participation in the employment promotion programme. 
Simple comparisons by programme recipient status can be used to estimate 
[ ]1|01 =− DYYE . However, such comparisons do not control for most of the criteria 
used by employers to choose which disabled to accept. The job quality of non-accepted 
disabled individuals might therefore provide a poor indicator of what measure recipients 
would have earned if they had not enjoyed any employment promotion measure. To 
explore this point further, note that the comparison by employment promotion measure 
recipient status can be decomposed as follows: 
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]0|1|{1|0|1| 000101 =−=+=−==−= DYEDYEDYYEDYEDYE }  (2) 
This shows that comparisons of job quality by beneficiary status are equal to 
[ ]1|01 =− DYYE  plus a bias term attributable to the fact that job quality of non-
recipients are not necessarily representative of what recipients would have enjoyed had 
they not enjoyed any employment promotion measure. That is, since measure 
beneficiary choices are likely to be the result of systematic decisions, the sample of 
individuals who are assigned to an employment promotion measure will not be random. 
If this is ignored and individuals who pass through employment measures are simply 
compared with those who did not, the estimates will suffer from bias11. 
 
4.2. Selection on observables: propensity score matching 
The matching method attempts to mimic ex post an experiment by choosing a 
comparison group from among the non-treated individuals such that they are as similar 
as possible to the treatment group in terms of their observable characteristics. All the 
outcome-relevant differences between treated and non-treated individuals are captured 
in their observable attributes, the only remaining difference between the two groups 
being their treatment status. In this case, the average outcome of the matched non-
                                                                                                                                               
Heckman et al., 1998; Agodini and Dynarski, 2001). Nevertheless, the technique continues to attract 
attention as a useful evaluation tool in the absence of random assignment. 
11 On the contrary, if employment promotion measure beneficiary status was randomly assigned, then D 
would be independent of Y0 and Y1, implying [ ]0|0 =DYE = [ ]0YE , and [ ]1|1 =DYE = [ ]1YE . In this 
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treated individuals constitutes the correct sample counterpart for the missing 
information on the outcomes the treated would have experienced, on average, had they 
not been treated.  
 
This way of overcoming the missing counterfactual rests on the so-called conditional 
independence assumption between non-treatment variables and the programme 
participation status D. This implies that if one can control for observable differences in 
characteristics between the treated and non-treated group, the outcome that would result 
in the absence of treatment is the same in both cases. It allows the counterfactual 
outcome for the treatment group to be inferred, and therefore, for any differences 
between the treated and non-treated to be attributed to the effect of the programme: 
XDYY |, 01 ⊥       (3) 
This assumption of selection on observables requires that, conditional on an appropriate 
set of observed attributes, the distribution of the (counterfactual) outcome Y0 in the 
treated group is the same as the (observed) distribution of Y0 in the non-treated group. 
Therefore, if the conditional independence assumption holds, the matching process is 
analogous to creating an experimental dataset in that, conditional on observed 
characteristics, the selection process is random.  Consequently, the distribution of the 
counterfactual outcome for the treated is the same as the observed outcomes for the non-
treated. 
However, when a wide range of X variables is in use, finding exact matches can be 
extremely difficult. This obstacle was overcome thanks to an important result showing 
that matching on a single index reflecting the probability of participation could achieve 
consistent estimates of the treatment effect in the same way as matching on all 
covariates (see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). Following Rosembaum and Rubin 
(1983)12, distance can be measured in terms of a balancing score q(X), defined as a 
function of the observables such that )(| XqDX ⊥ . One of such balancing scores is the 
propensity score, p(X), the probability to receive treatment given the set of pre-treatment 
characteristics: 
)|()|1Pr()( XDEXDXp ==≡      (4) 
                                                                                                                                               
case, the effect of treatment on the treated is also the average treatment effect in the population subject to 
randomization and can be estimated by simple comparisons. 
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By definition, treatment and non-treatment observations with the same value of the 
propensity score have the same distribution of observable (and unobservables) 
characteristics independently of the treatment status. In other words, for a given 
propensity score, exposure to treatment is random and therefore, treated and control 
units should be on average observationally identical. Propensity score thus reduces the 
high-dimensionality problem to a one-dimensional one: the estimation of the mean 
outcome in the non-treated group is a function of the propensity score.  
However, this problem of reduced chances of finding a match does not disappear 
entirely with propensity score matching. It is still possible that there will be nobody in 
the non-treatment group with a propensity score that is ‘similar’ to that of a particular 
treatment group individual. This is known as the ‘support’ problem. In order to 
overcome it, one has to identify participants who are poorly-matched and then omitting 
them from the estimation of treatment effects, so that any combination of characteristics 
seen among those in the treatment group may also be observed among those in the non-
treatment group. That is, when there is no support for the treated individual in the non-
treated population, this treated individual is dropped from the analysis. The estimated 
treatment effect has then to be redefined as the mean treatment effect for those treated 
falling within the common support.  
The explicit acknowledgement of the common support problem is one of the main 
features distinguishing matching methods from standard parametric regressions. The 
other main distinguishing feature is that matching is non-parametric. Consequently, it 
avoids the restrictions involved in models that require the relationship between 
characteristics and outcomes to be specified. 
 
6.  Estimations 
6.1. Estimating the propensity score 
The effects of employment promotion measures refer in this paper to their impact on job 
quality of measure recipients through two distinct outcomes — (i) having a permanent 
contract; (ii) searching for another job— relative to what would have happened to 
recipients if they had not passed through such measures. Since the propensity to 
participate is unknown, it needs first to be estimated through any standard probability 
                                                                                                                                               
12 Another unit-free metric, is the Mahalanobis one, which assigns weight to each coordinate of X in 
proportion to the inverse variance of that coordinate (see Blundell et al. 2004). See, also, Abadie and 
Imbens, 2002, and Zhao, 2004, for alternative matching metrics. 
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model. Our propensity score models (see Table 3) were fitted as two probit regression 
models—one for each outcome— where the dependent variable indicates being 
recipient of the corresponding measure, and the independent variables are the factors 
thought to influence participation and outcome. In this sense, propensity score matching 
becomes a semi-parametric approach to the evaluation problem (see Imbens, 2004). 
As regards the variables to include in the model when estimating the propensity score, 
we have chosen demographic, qualification, household and disability characteristics that 
are expected to influence both participation and outcome13.  In this sense, among the 
potential predictors of measure beneficiary and subsequent employment outcomes we 
include the following ones: whether or not the individual suffers only one disability, 
whether or not he/she has a certificate of disability, gender, age at the date of being 
hired, marital status, whether or not he/she is the main person in the household, whether 
or not he/she receives any sort of financial subsidy or benefit, whether or not he/she 
belongs to a non-profit organization for disabled people, and, finally, some variables 
related to his/her qualification (having passed through vocational training courses, and 
the level of education). 
In addition, we have taken into account that only variables that are unaffected by 
participation, or the anticipation of participation, should be included. To do otherwise 
would be to mask possibly important programme effects, undermining the 
interpretability of estimated effects (see Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999). In this 
sense, the aforementioned variables are either fixed over time (e.g., gender) or were 
collected at the date of eligibility and, as such are unaffected by measure beneficiary14. 
Fortunately, our dataset offers sufficiently rich information on pre-measure variables, 
which are likely to be important predictors of measure beneficiary and outcomes. The 
value of these variables is that they contain pre-measure information which may be 
                                                 
13 If a variable influences only measure beneficiary status, there is no need to control for the differences 
between the treatment and the comparison group since the outcome variable of interest is unaffected. 
Conversely, if a variable influences only the outcome variable, there is no need to control for it since it 
will not be significantly different between the treatment and comparison groups. In addition, should a 
variable thought to influence outcomes perfectly predict participation, recipients would have a propensity 
score of 1 and non-recipients a propensity score of 0. In these instances, it may be difficult to get an 
unbiased estimate of programme impact using propensity score matching. 
14 For this reason, we have excluded two variables from the set of independent variables in the propensity 
score estimations that, in spite of being available for our analysis, were likely to be affected by 
participation: firm size and region. The fact that a disabled worker is benefited by some employment 
promotion measured is likely to allow his contracting firm to hire more workers, given the savings that 
this hiring may imply for the firm. Similarly, if employment promotion measures are relatively more 
extended among certain geographical regions, benefiting from such measures may imply that being hired 
would more likely in certain geographical zones. 
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critical in estimating measure beneficiary status and post-measure outcomes. Moreover, 
they may help capture otherwise unobservable characteristics —such as motivation— 
which might also influence participation and outcomes. Those variables measured 
before beneficiary status are divided in the following groups: 
 
• The type of disability suffered by the individual (eyesight, hearing, language, 
understanding, travelling, physiological needs, not capable to do the housework 
or relationship difficulties) 
• Whether the individual suffering any of such disabilities receives help (either 
technical or personal help) 
• Whether the disability’s degree of severity is slight or moderate (very severe 
will be the reference category) 
• Age at the date of disability diagnosis 
 
As shown in Table 3, the propensity to being recipient of employment promotion 
measures is higher than average if disabled individuals are in possession of a certificate 
of disability, if they are men, if they receive financial subsidies or benefits, if they 
belong to a non-profit organization for disabled people or if they have followed 
vocational training courses. In addition, the type of disability suffered becomes a 
relevant determinant of measure beneficiary, in the sense that those with language 
disability are more likely to pass through employment promotion measures (as opposed 
to those with eyesight disability), as well as those with hearing disability receiving help, 
and those that have understanding or relationship disability to a slight or moderate 
degree. On the contrary, those with college degree, with a hearing or relationship 
disability, and with a language disability detected when they were below 16 years-old 
are less likely to being beneficiary of employment promotion measures. 
As regards the alternative type of treatment we are interested in (i.e., specialized 
intermediation beneficiary), the fact of having a certificate of disability is a positive 
determinant of being a recipient of such intermediation services, as well as being the 
head of the household. Moreover, individuals who have followed vocational training 
courses, those with a travelling disability who have received help, and the ones 
suffering from physiological needs disability being detected when they were below 16 
years-old, are also more likely to being recipients of specialized intermediation. On the 
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contrary, such type of intermediation is less likely among disabled with college degree, 
among those with physiological needs disability, those with relationship disability who 
have received help, and, finally, the ones suffering from household jobs disability 
detected when they were below 16 years-old. 
 
5.2. Implementing propensity score matching estimators  
An estimate of the propensity score is not enough to estimate the average treatment on 
the treated (ATT) of interest, given that the probability of observing two units with 
exactly the same value of the propensity score is in principle zero, since p(X) is a 
continuous variable (see equation [4] above). Various methods have been proposed in 
the literature to identify the comparator group through propensity score matching. 
Those methods reach different points on the frontier of the trade-off between quality 
and quantity of the matches and none of them is a priori superior to the others. Thus, 
their joint consideration in our empirical analysis offers a way to assess the robustness 
of the estimates. We have used the publicly available Stata command developed by 
Leuven and Sianesi (2003) that performs the types of propensity score matching 
presented in this section. Table 4 shows the estimated ATT for the aggregate 
employment promotion measure, while Table 4 shows the estimated ATT for the 
specialised intermediation measure. We have imposed with all these methods the 
common support restriction. This way, we ensure that any combination of 
characteristics seen among those in the treatment group may also be observed among 
those in the non-treatment group (as commented on above)15.  
The traditional and most intuitive form of matching is nearest-neighbour (or one-to-
one) matching, which takes each treated unit and searches for the control unit with the 
closest propensity score.  The resulting set of non-treatment individuals constitutes the 
comparison group. Although it is not necessary, the method is usually applied with 
replacement, in the sense that a control unit can be a best match for more than one 
treated unit. Matching with replacement in this way is less demanding in terms of the 
support requirement since individuals in the comparator group who would provide the 
closest match to a number of treated individuals remain available16. Once each treated 
                                                 
15 We are conscious of the fact that, dong this, high quality matches may be lost at the boundaries of the 
common support and the sample may be considerable reduced.(see Lechner, 2001). 
16 Should a certain type of individual be common in the treatment group but relatively uncommon in the 
comparison group, the pool of comparators able to provide a close match would become exhausted in 
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unit is matched with a control unit, the difference between the outcome of the treated 
units and the outcome of the matched control units is computed. The ATT of interest is 
then obtained by averaging these differences17. Estimated nearest-neighbour treatment 
effects for aggregate employment promotion measure beneficiary (Table 4) indicate a 
positive effect for the outcome of reaching a permanent contract, and a negative effect 
for the outcome of searching for another job. However, none of these effects is 
statistically significant. Equally, the estimated ATT for specialized intermediation are 
non-significant (Table 5), independently of the quality outcome considered. 
Some of the matches found through nearest-neighbour might be fairly poor because for 
some treated units the nearest neighbour may have a very different propensity score and 
nevertheless he would contribute to the estimation of the treatment effect independently 
of this difference. The radius matching and kernel matching methods offer a solution to 
this problem. With radius matching, each treated unit is matched only with the control 
units whose propensity score falls in a predefined neighbourhood of the propensity 
score of the treated unit. If the dimension of the neighbourhood (i.e., the radius) is set to 
be very small, it is possible that some treated units are not matched because the 
neighbourhood does not contain control units. That is, the smaller the radius, the more 
difficult it is to find a match within that range, resulting in a greater number of cases 
failing the support requirement. On the other hand, the smaller the size of the 
neighbourhood, the better is the quality of the matches. Results, therefore, may be 
sensitive to the size of the radius that is the bases for matching. We tested the sensitivity 
of our results to three radii: 0.005, 0.01 and 0.02.  
In kernel-based matching, all treated are matched with a weighted average of all 
controls with weights that are inversely proportional to the distance between the 
propensity scores of treated and controls. The ‘kernel’ is a function that weights the 
contribution of each comparison group member, usually so that more importance is 
attached to those comparators providing a better match. The most common approach is 
                                                                                                                                               
case that matching were carried out without replacement. This is the reason why the technique is only 
implemented with replacement in our analysis. 
17 A variant of nearest-neighbour is caliper matching (see Cochran and Rubin, 1973 or Dehejia and 
Wahba, 1999). Its defining characteristic is a tolerance it sets when comparing propensity scores, in other 
words a ‘propensity range’ in which a match is deemed acceptable. Where the propensity score of a 
treated individual falls beyond the bound set for a near comparator, this treated individual will remain 
unmatched. That is, the “calliper” is used to exclude observations for which there is no close match, thus 
enforcing common support. The appeal of calliper matching is that it imposes a form of quality control on 
the match. Any treatment group members left unmatched are discarded from the analysis. However, a 
practical objection to its use is that it will often not be obvious how to set the tolerance. 
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to use the normal distribution (with a mean of zero) as a kernel, where the weight 
attached to a particular comparator is proportional to the frequency of the distribution 
for the difference in scores observed. This means that exact matches get a large weight, 
and poor matches get a small weight.  
As regards the likelihood of attaining a permanent contract from participation in 
employment promotion programmes (see Table 4), radius matching and the 
Epanechinov kernel matching offer an estimated positive ATT. The difference of the 
former with respect to the remainder matching methods might well come from the fact 
that radius matching only uses those treated that have control matches within radius r —
while in the nearest neighbour matching procedure, 166 out of 399 treated units are 
used, in the radius matching 127 (with calliper 0.005), 141 (with calliper 0.01), and 151 
(with calliper 0.02) are used18. In any case, in Table 4, neither the estimated results with 
radius matching nor with kernel matching are statistically significant.  
As regards the evaluation of specialized intermediation (Table 5), the probability of 
achieving a permanent contract is significantly lower for treated individuals under the 
kernel matching method (except for the biweight kernel). The remainder matching 
techniques offer non-significant estimators.  
Thus, as a summary, the propensity score evaluation indicated that participation in 
employment promotion measures has no significant effect on the job matching quality 
of disabled individuals. Better chances to find a permanent job —apparent in the raw 
data see Section 3 of descriptive results— are no longer apparent once participation in 
employment promotion measures are compared with “like” non-participants. Thus, 
participants’ better outcomes are attributable to comparative advantages that are 
independent of the employment promotion measures. Moreover, specialized 
intermediation presents a significant negative impact on the probability of finding a 
permanent job, but this effect is non-robust to the matching technique implemented. 
A possible interpretation of these results is that disabled workers who are beneficiaries 
of employment promotion measures or specialized labour market intermediation will 
enjoy a similar job matching quality than others disabled workers. Therefore, these 
active labour market policies will have neither an adverse effect on separation 
probabilities under an economic crisis nor a positive effect. It is important to remark 
that our results do not say anything about the job matching quality of the disabled 
                                                 
18 If the radius were chosen to be very small, many treated units would not be matched, and the results 
would no longer be representative of the population treated (see Smith and Todd, 2003). 
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workers compared to the average job matching quality of non-disabled workers19. 
Finally, if we regard having an open-ended contract and not searching for another job as 
signals of a long-term attachment to the labour market (in special the type of contract), 
we must conclude that these policy measures do not improve the disabled individuals’ 
long-term attachment to the labour market. 
 
5.3. Assessing the quality of the matching 
The final step to applying matching should be to test the resulting matching quality in 
terms of covariate balance in the matched groups. To be effective, matching should 
balance characteristics across the treatment and matched comparison groups. A measure 
of the bias can be calculated for each characteristic in order to achieve a standardised 
indicator of the degree to which the matching has been successful in balancing (see, for 
example, Sianesi, 2001)20.  
Tables 6 and 7 provide some diagnostics on the performance of the match for 
employment promotion measures and specialized intermediation. Each cell represents 
the percent reduction in the bias (between members of the treatment group and those of 
the comparison group) for significant covariates used to model treatment status. The 
bias is the difference of the sample means in the treated and non-treated (full or 
matched) sub-samples as a percentage of the square root of the average of the sample 
variances in the treated and non-treated groups (formulae from Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1985). Ideally, one would have a 100 percent reduction in every significant covariate. 
As can be observed, while in Table 6, the bias is not reduced for some covariates in 
matching techniques 5,  7 and 8 (the corresponding cell figures are negative), in Table 7, 
this occurs for the first three matching methods. In addition, note also that reduction in 
covariate imbalance is not especially high in some variables for the nearest-neighbour 
technique (in fact, the nearest method, as previously underlined, may at times turn out to 
be quite apart). Therefore, we can conclude that matching quality is better for radius 
matching concerning evaluation of employment promotion measures, while it is better 
for kernel matching concerning evaluation of specialized intermediaries. 
                                                 
19 Blázquez and Malo (2004) analyze the influence of being disabled on educational mismatch using 
Spanish data of the ECHP and they conclude that disability does not significantly affect to mismatch. 
20 A similar approach can be adopted to assist with specifying the participation model. The balancing test 
was proposed in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and applied in, for example, Dehejia and Wahba (1998). 
However, the balancing test does not aid in solving the variable selection problem. It only aids in model 
specification for a given set of conditioning variables. It cannot provide any indication as to whether the 
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7. Conclusions 
In this article we have presented an analysis about the effect of employment promotion 
measures for people with disabilities on the quality of their job matching. This is a 
novelty in current literature because previous research has mainly focused on the 
disincentive effects on activity of income transfers related to disability. The analysis of 
the quality of the job matching is linked to the attachment to the labour market of 
people with disabilities. Those with a poor match will presumably suffer a higher 
dismissal probability in an economic crisis, worsening their welfare and creating 
disruptions in their labour career. Anyway, as Jovanovic (1979) explains the job is an 
experience good and when the quality of the job match is low the separation probability 
(by either dismissal or quit) will increase. Therefore, it is relevant to know whether 
policy programmes intended to improve labour market participation of people with 
disabilities have a positive or a negative effect (or any effect at all) on job match 
quality. 
In addition, our empirical analysis uses a Spanish database specially launched to have 
an accurate picture on people of disabilities and their relationship with the labour 
market. Following the recommendations of the World Health Organization, this 
database uses a definition of disability related to disability to day-to-day activities and 
not to disability to work, and therefore eliminating the potential bias of self-reported 
disability measures (which is an endogeneity bias21). Therefore, the data are especially 
suitable for the objective of our empirical analysis. 
To evaluate the effects of the employment measures on the quality of job matching of 
people with disabilities we have applied the non-experimental evaluation methodology 
called as matching analysis. We have used two variables as proxies of such quality: the 
type of contract and whether the worker is searching another job or not. The first can be 
understood as a ‘demand-side’ valuation of the quality job match, because the type of 
contract is mainly (and usually) decided by the firm and the worker accepts or not the 
type of contract offered by the firm. The second one is a ‘supply-side’ valuation, 
because workers who search for another job are denoting that there is not a perfect 
match between their current positions and their optimal one in their current firm. 
                                                                                                                                               
conditional independence assumption is plausible, merely whether the matching has been successful in 
balancing the characteristics included in the model across the treatment and comparison groups. 
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The main results show that employment promotion measures do not improve the 
match’s job quality (either valuated from the demand or the supply side). Furthermore, 
the use of specialized labour market intermediation services by disabled individuals 
does not affect, in general, their job matching quality. 
The policy implications of these results are not pessimistic but neither optimistic. These 
measures have not negative effects on the quality of the job match and, therefore, they 
are not stepping stones on the labour careers of workers with disabilities. However, they 
are not increasing the job match quality respect to those workers who are not 
beneficiaries of these measures. This is especially worrying for specialized services for 
labour market intermediation which should increase not only the probability of 
participation into the labour market but the quality of the job match too. Maybe, 
employment promotion measures and intermediation services are mainly focused to 
solve short-term problems related to the access to job, and they should add a wider 
perspective considering the labour career prospects of people with disabilities. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
21 See, for example, Benítez-Silva et al. (2000) for an extensive discussion about self-reported bias and 
endogeneity in disability research. 
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Table 1. Participation in the labour market and number of disabilities 
 
 1 2 3 4 or more Total 
Employment 39.22 30.69 23.47 12.68 23.88 
Unemployment 10.67 9.95 9.71 6.05 8.36 
Inactivity 50.11 59.37 66.82 81.27 67.76 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: EDDES-1999 and authors’ calculations 
 
 
Table 2. Distribution of being beneficiary of an employment promotion measure or 
a specialized intermediation service considering the quality of the job matching 
(type of contract and searching for another job) 
 
 
 Employment promotion measures Specialized intermediation services 
Type of contract Yes No Total Yes No Total 
Temporary 19.75 80.25 100.00 12.32 87.68 100.00 
Open-ended 16.90 83.10 100.00 7.85 92.15 100.00 
Total 17.72 82.28 100.00 9.13 90.87 100.00 
Searching for 
another job 
Yes No Total Yes No Total 
Yes 10.72 89.28 100.00 9.89 90.11 100.00 
No 18.16 81.84 100.00 9.08 90.92 100.00 
Total 17.72 82.28 100.00 9.13 90.87 100.00 
Source: EDDES-1999 and authors’ calculations 
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Table 3. Propensity score estimations (probit models) 
 Empl. Promotio Intermediation 
Variables Coef. z Coef. Z 
Only one disability 0.007 0.040 0.038 0.160 
Disability certificate 1.080 6.790 1.006 4.870 
Gender (1=Men) 0.537 3.210 0.168 0.830 
Age -0.013 -0.330 -0.084 -1.650 
Age squared 0.000 -0.010 0.001 1.110 
Marital status (1=married) -0.256 -1.420 -0.169 -0.760 
Head of the household (1=Yes) -0.163 -0.900 0.496 2.170 
Household size 0.020 0.380 0.108 1.740 
Financial subsidies or benefits (1=Yes) 0.386 2.610 0.098 0.540 
Belongs to a non-profit organization for disabled people 0.671 3.860 0.875 4.450 
Has followed vocational training courses  0.333 1.970 0.665 3.520 
Primary studies 0.105 0.490 0.032 0.130 
Middle school -0.187 -0.620 -0.080 -0.220 
Vocational  training  -0.395 -1.200 -0.315 -0.790 
College degree -0.575 -1.960 -0.907 -2.250 
Eyesight disability - - - - 
Hearing disability -0.784 -2.050 0.574 1.430 
Language disability 0.657 1.780 -0.053 -0.110 
Understanding disability 0.576 0.620 -0.363 -0.360 
Travelling disability 0.309 1.180 0.502 1.590 
Physiological needs disability 0.197 0.210 -1.669 -1.760 
Household jobs disability 0.437 1.090 0.655 1.470 
Relationship disability -2.582 -2.700 0.200 0.240 
Eyesight disability & receives help 0.475 1.550 0.424 1.220 
Hearing diability & receives help  0.832 2.720 -0.028 -0.070 
Language disability & receives help   -0.089 -0.140 0.182 0.280 
Understanding disanility & receives help   0.213 0.310 1.015 1.270 
Travelling disability & receives help   0.207 1.110 0.434 1.900 
Physiological needs disability & receives help   0.247 0.290 - - 
Household jobs disability & receives help   -0.382 -1.110 -0.291 -0.770 
Relationship disability & receives help   -0.902 -0.970 -2.057 -2.110 
Eyesight disability & slight or moderate severity -0.425 -1.530 -0.141 -0.410 
Hearing diability & slight or moderate severity 0.441 1.270 -0.099 -0.270 
Language disability & slight or moderate severity -0.477 -0.870 0.022 0.040 
Understanding disability & slight or moderate severity   1.061 2.020 -0.417 -0.790 
Travelling disability & slight or moderate severity 0.059 0.320 -0.306 -1.390 
Physiological needs disability & slight or moderate severity -0.343 -0.520 1.824 1.770 
Household jobs disability & slight or moderate severity 0.544 1.750 0.268 0.800 
Relationship disability & slight or moderate severity 1.978 2.380 -0.233 -0.320 
Eyesight disability & under 16 0.211 0.910 0.342 1.260 
Hearing diability & under 16 0.385 1.260 -0.490 -1.270 
Language disability & under 16 -0.835 -1.770 0.284 0.510 
Understanding disanility & under 16 0.228 0.260 1.425 1.410 
Travelling disability & under 16 0.169 0.840 0.027 0.110 
Physiological needs disability & under 16 0.208 0.350 0.389 0.570 
Household jobs disability & under 16 -0.599 -1.640 -0.731 -1.780 
Relationship disability & under 16 1.668 1.640 -0.031 -0.030 
Constant -1.889 -2.130 -1.403 -1.320 
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Observations 975 975 
LR chi2(46) 394.98 252.29 
Log likelihood -256.766 -176.283 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 
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Table 4. Average treatment effect on the treated. The treatment refers to having 
been recipient of any employment promotion measures  
 
OUTCOME: Matching method Treated Untreated Difference 
Nearest-neighbour matching method with 
replacement & common support 
.6927 .6385 .0542 
(.1023) 
Radius matching with common support    
Caliper 005 .7244 .6888 .0356  
(.1032) 
Caliper 0.01 .7234 .6795 .0438 
(.1119) 
Caliper 0.02 .7086 .7059 .0026 
(.1082) 
Kernel matching with common support    
Epanechnikov kernel .6927 .6890 .0037 
(.1024) 
Gaussian kernel .6927 .6983 -.0055 
(.1040) 
Biweight  kernel .6927 .6939 -.0011 
(.1037)  
Reaching a 
permanent 
contract 
Uniform kernel .6927 .6834 .0092 
(.1080)  
Nearest-neighbour matching method with 
replacement & common support 
.0602 .0963 -.0361  
(.0518) 
Radius matching with common support    
Caliper 005 .0708 .1228 -.0519  
(.1041) 
Caliper 0.01 .0638 .0694 -.0055 
(.0989) 
Caliper 0.02 .0596 .0587 .0008 
(.1029) 
Kernel matching with common support    
Epanechnikov kernel .0602 .0546 .0055 
(.1011) 
Gaussian kernel .0602 .0566 .0035 
(.1056) 
Biweight  kernel .0602 .0548 .0054 
(.1049)  
Searching for 
another job 
Uniform kernel .0602 .0537 .0064 
 (.1085) 
 
Note: The entries in brackets are the bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications)
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Table 5. Average treatment effect on the treated. The treatment refers to having 
access to employment through specialized intermediation services for disabled 
people  
 
 
OUTCOME: Matching method Treated Untreated Difference 
Nearest-neighbour matching method with 
replacement & common support 
.5909 .6932 -.1023  
(.0995) 
Radius matching with common support    
Caliper 005 .6323 .6908 -.0585 
(.0664) 
Caliper 0.01 .6164 .6645 -.0481 
(.0659) 
Caliper 0.02 .6266 .7129 -.0863 
(.0624) 
Kernel matching with common support    
Epanechnikov kernel .6000 .7021 -.1021 
(.0642)  
Gaussian kernel .5909 .7015 -.1106 
(.0656) 
Biweight  kernel .6000  .7037 -.1037 
(.0735) 
Reaching a 
permanent 
contract 
Uniform kernel .6000 .6973 -.0973 
(.0587) 
Nearest-neighbour matching method with 
replacement & common support 
.0795 .1022 -.0227  
(.0647)  
Radius matching with common support    
Caliper 005 .0882 .0898 -.0015 
(.0686) 
Caliper 0.01 .0821 .0814 .0007 
(.0764) 
Caliper 0.02 .0800 .0787 .0012 
(.0678) 
Kernel matching with common support    
Epanechnikov kernel .0823 .0652 .0170 
(.0670)  
Gaussian kernel .0795 .0640 .0155  
(.0636) 
Biweight  kernel .0823 .0659 .0163 
(.0621) 
Searching for 
another job 
Uniform kernel .0823 .0642 .0180 
(.0751)  
Note: The entries in brackets are the bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications). 
 31
Table 6. Percent reduction in covariate imbalance after propensity score matching 
for employment promotion measures.  
 
 MATCHING METHODS 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Disability certificate 98.0 96.8 97.1 99.9 99.3 96.9 99.6 98.9 
Gender (1=Men) 52.5 86.1 56.3 46.7 78.3 69.8 77.7 82.4 
Financial subsidies or benefits (1=Yes) 93.6 88.3 92.2 95.5 97.5 95.3 98.7 94.3 
Belongs to a non-profit organization for disabled 
people 100.0
 
97.7
 
95.1 93.4 97.2 99.0 97.7 95.8 
Has followed vocational training courses  49.2
 
88.0
 
61.8 72.1 71.3 80.2 71.3 70.6 
Collage degree 62.0 60.7 69.5 73.7 81.4 87.6 79.8 82.0 
Hearing disability 85.8 93.0 95.7 98.8 82.3 88.7 80.0 89.1 
Language disability 73.6 91.6 96.0 98.7 74.6 80.3 74.4 78.7 
Relationship disability 51.3 86.7 71.7 78.3 69.3 77.0 65.7 74.4 
Hearing disability & receives help 6.7 81.6 72.6 85.0 -34.4 18.9 -33.2 -25.1 
Understanding disability & slight or moderate severity 100.0
 
99.1
 
85.8 88.9 84.7 96.2 89.4 76.5 
Relationship disability & slight or moderate severity 100.0
 
52.9
 
66.1 86.5 86.7 86.6 88.5 84.1 
Language disability & under 16 64.4 83.2 89.7 89.4 72.5 82.1 69.0 78.3 
Notes: This table shows the convergence of mean values on key variables in the propensity store 
equation, with non/participant characteristics closely resembling those of participants alter matching. The 
bias is the difference of the sample means in the treated and non-treated (full or matched) sub-samples as 
a percentage of the square root of the average of the sample variances in the treated and non-treated 
groups (formulae from Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). 
(1) Nearest-neighbour matching method with replacement & common support 
(2) Radius matching with common support, caliper 0.005 
(3) Radius matching with common support calliper 0.01 
(4) Radius matching with common support, calliper 0.02 
(5) Epanechnikov kernel 
(6) Gaussian kernel 
(7) Biweight  kernel 
(8) Uniform kernel 
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Table 7. Percent reduction in covariate imbalance after propensity score matching 
for specialized intermediaries.  
 
 MATCHING METHODS 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Disability certificate 94.0 93.5 97.0 98.9 98.4 91.6 98.3 98.6 
Head of the household (1=Yes) 89.1 87.4 87.4 72.6 57.4 73.5 56.4 57.5 
Belongs to a non-profit organization for disabled  83.4 96.1 98.0 97.4 95.3 97.7 95.3 95.4 
Has followed vocational training courses 93.4
 
90.2
 
83.8 89.0 83.2 83.4 86.7 78.5 
Collage degree 100.0 98.1 99.2 91.8 86.7 91.2 87.4 86.8 
Physiological needs disability 2.3 57.3 49.8 55.9 36.8 37.3 30.6 46.9 
Physiological needs disability & receives help  49.2
 
73.9
 
71.1 85.7 97.0 98.7 93.5 98.4 
Relationship disability & receives help  -75.8 -64.9 -216.1 16.5 83.2 65.3 73.9 92.7 
Physiological needs disability & slight or moderate 
severity -16.5
 
82.7
 
50.1 60.5 53.2 56.5 42.6 69.8 
Household jobs disability & under 16 55.0
 
93.6
 
94.3 90.1 85.6 92.3 85.1 84.8 
Notes: This table shows the convergence of mean values on key variables in the propensity store 
equation, with non/participant characteristics closely resembling those of participants alter matching. The 
bias is the difference of the sample means in the treated and non-treated (full or matched) sub-samples as 
a percentage of the square root of the average of the sample variances in the treated and non-treated 
groups (formulae from Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). 
(1) Nearest-neighbour matching method with replacement & common support 
(2) Radius matching with common support, caliper 0.005 
(3) Radius matching with common support calliper 0.01 
(4) Radius matching with common support, calliper 0.02 
(5) Epanechnikov kernel 
(6) Gaussian kernel 
(7) Biweight  kernel 
(8) Uniform kernel 
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APPENDIX 
Table A.1. Means and Standard Deviations in the sample of wage and salary 
workers with disabilities 
Variable Weight Mean Std, Dev, Min Max
Open-ended contract 1021 0.71 0.45 0 1 
Searching for another job 1021 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Being disabled 1021 0.38 0.48 0 1 
Official certificate of being disabled 1021 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Gender (1= Male) 1021 0.67 0.47 0 1 
Age 1021 42.97 11.81 16 64 
Age Squared 1021 1985.50 1007.95 256 4096
Civil Status (1=Married) 1021 0.63 0.48 0 1 
Head of the household (1=Yes) 1021 0.59 0.49 0 1 
Household size 1021 3.61 1.38 1 10 
Receiving any sort of benefit or subsidy (1=Yes) 1021 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Being a member of a NGO related to disability 1021 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Region: South 1021 0.18 0.39 0 1 
Region: East Coast 1021 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Region: North Coast 1021 0.16 0.36 0 1 
Region: Ebro River 1021 0.04 0.21 0 1 
Region: Centre (Castilla and Madrid) 1021 0.22 0.42 0 1 
Region: Balearic and Canary Islands 1021 0.05 0.23 0 1 
Vocational training courses (1=Yes) 1021 0.17 0.37 0 1 
Illiterate or without studies 1021 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Primary Level and Compulsory Secondary Level 1021 0.58 0.49 0 1 
Non-compulsory Secondary Level 1021 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Vocational Training 1021 0.06 0.24 0 1 
University or Postgraduate Studies 1021 0.14 0.34 0 1 
Firm Size: <10 workers 1021 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Firm Size: 10-49 workers 1021 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Firm Size: 50-500 workers 1021 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Firm Size: 500 workers or more 1021 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Empl. Prom.: Training contract (1=Yes) 1021 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Empl. Prom.: Fiscal incentives for contracts 1021 0.03 0.17 0 1 
Empl. Prom.: Quota in the public sector 1021 0.02 0.12 0 1 
Empl. Prom.: Quota in the private sector 1021 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Empl. Prom.: Special help for re-entry in the labour market  1021 0.01 0.11 0 1 
Empl. Prom.: Subsidies 1021 0.01 0.09 0 1 
Empl. Prom.: Sheltered employment centres 1021 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Empl. Prom.: Beneficiary of any of the previous measures 1021 0.18 0.38 0 1 
User of specialized labour market intermediation to obtain the 
current job (1=Yes) 1021 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Source: EDDES-1999 and authors’ calculations 
 
